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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS, a Utah
corporation sole,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13704

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent seeks money damages against
defendant-appellant arising out of the failure of the latter
to pay the former pursuant to certain alleged collateral
assignments in its favor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-respondent was awarded judgment in the
amount of $59,205.80, interest and costs, pursuant to its
complaint as amended at trial over objections of defendant-appellant.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks a complete reversal of
the trial court's judgment against it and prays that this
Court grant judgment in its favor, no cause of action as
to all claims of plaintiff-respondent; in the event this
Court does not grant a reversal, defendant-appellant seeks
appropriate modification of the Judgment in accordance
with the Argument infra.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of certain transactions and surrounding circumstances, which occurred during 1968 and
1969 by and among the plaintiff, Bank of Salt Lake (sometimes "Bank"), Kerry-Aldon, Inc., and Leland Ronald
Bruderer ("Bruderer"), at that time a low-level employee
in the office of the department of Seminars and Institutes
of the Church Schools, a division of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, an unincorporated association
(Church). (R. 100-105, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 197). During the latter part of 1968 and early 1969, the Church was
purchasing various manufacturers' lines of school furniture and fixtures from, among others, Kerry-Aldon, Inc.
The plaintiff was, at least in part, financing the operation
of Kerry-Aldon, Inc., as it had the operation of KerryAldon Associates, the partnership through which Kerry
Rapp and Aldon Cook had done business prior to the
incorporation of Kerry-Aldon, Inc. in June, 1968. Among
the receivables assigned as security for some of the promissory notes by Kerry-Aldon, Inc., and one or more of the
officers of said corporation, to Bank were payments due on
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certain invoices representing items of school furniture and
fixtures sold to various departments of the Church.
In connection with each of the subject transactions
form letters were prepared by plaintiff addressed to Mr.
Leland Bruderer, Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church,
Union Pacific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. (R.
46-49) Bruderer was selected as the addressee of these
letters by the plaintiff solely on the advice of Mr. Aldon
Cook, a principal in Kerry-Aldon, Inc., who, at the request
of Plaintiff, hand delivered these letters to Mr. Bruderer,
one letter having been brought to him at his home on a
Sunday. (R. 46-49; 171). One of these letters, which was
signed by an Assistant Vice President of the Bank, contained, inter alia, the following language below the Bank
officer's signature:
Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church, hereby
acknowledges the indebtedness described above
and agrees to the assignment consenting to make
all disbursements on the above invoices payable to
the Bank of Salt Lake and Kerry-Aldon Associates,
jointly, and to mail such disbursements to the Bank
of Salt Lake, 3081 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church
By: / s / Leland R. Bruderer
Title
Budget and Records Offices
(Exhibit 5-P-C-)
This language was representative of that portion of
all letters below the Bank's signature, except that the
first acknowledgement did not indicate Bruderer's title.
(Exhibit 2-P-C; see Exhibits 2-P-C through 5-P-C).
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The body of each of these letters misrepresented that
credit had ben extended to Kerry-Aldon Associates by the
Bank of Salt Lake and that in consideration therefor KerryAldon Associates had assigned the proceeds of certain
invoices. (R. 158-159)
As directed by plaintiff, Mr. Cook personally delivered each of these letters to Mr. Bruderer, obtained his signature on the acknowledgment, and returned each letter to
the plaintiff. (R. 46-49; 171).
Bruderer indicated that he signed the acknowlegments with the understanding that Cook would send
through the "assigned" invoices to the appropriate Church
department with the names of Kerry-Aldon Inc. and the
Bank on them. Bruderer indicated to Cook at the time he
signed them that he (Bruderer) had no authority to sign
the acknowledgments and Cook, according to Bruderer,
well knew at that time that he had no authority to sign
the acknowledgments. (R. 104, 105) Cook further stated
that the invoices when presented would have the name of
the Bank on them for payment. (R. 104, 105). At no time
did anyone on behalf of the Bank, except Cook, contact
Bruderer or anyone else who worked for the Church nor
did anyone ever contact any representative of Corporation
of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, a Utah corporation sole, the defendant in this
action (Corporation of the President). (R. 105, 108, 168)
At the time of these "acknowledgments" Bruderer
was a low-level employee of the Seminaries and Institutes
Department of the Church Educational System. The only
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employees working under him then were a full-time secretary and, later, a part-time secretary. (R. 100) There were
numerous men above him in the hierarchy of the Seminaries and Institutes Department, and additional persons in
the Church Educational System. (R. 113, 114, 195, 196)
His duties were largely clerical. He obtained basic factual
payroll information from seminary and institute teachers.
He also filled out requisition forms from requests by seminaries or institutes, some types of which requests were
initially reviewed by his immediate superior and assigned
to Bruderer. The requisition forms, when filled out, went
to Bruderer's immediate superior, a Mr. Gardner, for his
review, approval and signature. Bruderer's sole nonclerical function was recommending various types or
brands of school furniture and fixtures for and estimating
the aggregate cost of furnishing any given room in a specific seminary or institute. He had no control over pricing,
.returning defective merchandise, paying or receiving
merchandise he recommended. Requisitions filled in by
Mr. Bruderer, when approved and signed by Mr. Gardner,
went either directly to the Church Purchasing Department
or first to the Church Building Department, depending
upon whether the requested items were to go to a seminary
or institute already built or one under construction. After
Purchasing Department and/or Building Department approval, the Purchasing Department would prepare a purchase order from the requisition. Only the Building
and/or Purchasing and the Financial Departments were
involved in the transaction from the time the requisition
left Mr. Gardner's office. (R. 41-43, 60-64, 100-105, 109114, 211) Bruderer had no authority to sign any instru-
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ments, papers or documents during this period nor did he
have any authority in financial matters. (R. 44, 60, 101104)
During the period of time relevant to this action,
Bruderer officed in various buildings in Salt Lake City.
He (in common with thousands of Church employees)
could be reached by telephone through an extension of the
L.D.S. Church central switchboard. (R. 40, 99, 100) The
suite in which Bruderer's office was located was identified as housing some offices of the Seminaries and Institutes Department of the Church Education System. He
was paid during this period of time by Corporation of the
President as were some 6,000 persons, including employees
of several separately incorporated entities such as hospital, welfare, and social service corporations. He was
actually hired by the Church Board of Education. (R. 195
etseq.)
The first of the four (4) promissory notes executed by
Kerry-Aldon, Inc. in favor of the Bank and secured by
collateral assignments of invoices including some of those
at- the C h u r c h \ Purchasing Department, in the amount
of $14,280.00, was dated on or about August 14, 1968,
and was allegedly secured by unspecified "Invoices to LDS
Church Department of Seminaries and Institutes totaling
$18,978.36". This note was satisfied 2 months after it
became overdue by an involuntary offset against the bank
account of Kerry-Aldon, Inc. (not Kerry-Aldon Associates) on or about January 13, 1969. (R. 171) Various
amounts were paid on the other three promissory notes
from different sources and at various and sundry times.
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One of the Church^ invoices purportedly assigned
to the Bank was allegedly No. 1171 in the amount of some
$34,966.00. This invoice did not exist at the time of its
alleged assignment. (R. 54-59) It was at that time a blank
invoice form in the office of Mr. Cook. It was later used
but the total amount thereof was $85.00. (Exhibit 22-D)
The so-called assignment of invoice No. 1171 was by
Aldon Cook, individually, and not Kerry-Aldon, Inc.
(Exhibit 4-P-E)
Mr. Cook failed to make good on his promise to see
that the Bank's name was included on all of the Churches
invoices. None of the Seminaries and Institutes or Building Department invoices were made payable to the Bank
and Kerry-Aldon, Inc., jointly. Bruderer did not notify
anyone anent the purported assignmentJ(R. 108-109)
None of the assignments, invoices, acknowledgments
or other documents, letters, papers or instruments involved
in the transactions hereinabove described purport to relate to Corporation of the President, the defendant herein, nor was there any consideration given Corporation of
the President or the Church for any of the "acknowledgments".
In October 1969, the President of the Bank, Mr.
Norton Parker, sent a letter to Mr. Bruderer calling to
his attention that the Bank had received no jointly payable checks pursuant to the "assignments" and requesting
that that situation be corrected. (Exhibit 10-P) Some time
later the Bank also obtained a general assignment of all
Kerry-Aldon, Inc.'s accounts receivable and filed a financing statement covering the same in the office of the
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Utah Secretary of State but apparently made no attempt
to give either the Church or Corporation of the President
notice thereof. (Exhibit 6-P)
All checks issued by Corporation of the President
relative to\m invoices purportedly assigned^by Bank of
Salt Lake were deposited to the account of Kerry-Aldon,
Inc. at Bank of Salt Lake, and, during the relevant time
period, there were funds in said account sufficient to
cover the aforementioned promissory notes as they became due. (Exhibits 16-D, 18-D)

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR I N ITS JUDGMENT BECAUSE
DEFENDANT WAS N O T A PARTY T O ANY
OF THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE.
It is elementary that one who is not a party to
an agreement cannot be bound by the terms thereof.
Thus, according to 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts §§294-295:
As a general thing obligation of contracts is limited
to the parties making them, and ordinarily, only
those who are parties to contracts are liable for
their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby
impose any liability and in any event, in order to
bind a third person contractually, an expression of
assent by such person is necessary.
It is also elementary that a debtor who has not been
notified of an assignment cannot be bound by its terms.
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Section 70A-9-318, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provides in part:
The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives notification
that the account has been assigned and that payment is to be made by the assignee. A notification which does not reasonably identify the rights
assigned is ineffective.
While the plaintiff dealt with and named various
persons and entities in the instruments, papers, and documents comprising the subject transactions, nowhere is the
defendant named as a party thereto. Where in any of the
transactions of which plaintiff makes isue does the name
of the defendant appear? Where in any of the instruments
documents, or papers upon which plaintiff relies is the
name of the defendant set forth? Where is any notice upon
which plaintiff relies directed to the defendant? If plaintiff claims the defendant entered into a agreement, where
is the agreement to which the defendant is a party? If the
plaintiff intended to deal with and give notice to defendant, why didn't it address its various letters and documents to defendant?
All of the aforementioned questions must be answered in favor of the defendant. Whatever parties the
plaintiff chose to identify as being involved in the subject
transactions, it did not identify the defendant. The failure
of plaintiff in this respect leads to the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff did not consider nor intend defendant to
be a part of or involved in any manner in the subject transactions. Naming of the defendant in this action is an afterthought, an attempt of plaintiff to escape the effects of its
9
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own negligence in failing to make necessary inquiry, failing to draft its own documents and instruments with a
sufficient degree of intelligent precision, and failing to
avoid the consequences of its acts and omissions when such
avoidance was within its power.
As to the defendant, all the papers, documents and
instruments offered by the plaintiff were irrelevant and
incompetent, especially the letters from the Bank to Bruderer. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 836. These letters also
come within the general rule that correspondence of third
persons, where offered as proof of the facts therein stated,
fall within the purview of, and thus may be subject to
exclusion under, the hearsay evidence rule. 29 Am Jur 2d,
Evidence § 881.

POINT

II

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR I N FINDING T H A T SUCH
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN DEFENDANT A N D BRUDERER SO
AS T O CHARGE DEFENDANT AS ADJUDGED.
The defendant is a Utah corporation sole. (Exhibit
12-D) The creation of the relation of principal and agent
by such corporation is governed by Section 16-7-8, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
All deeds and other instruments of writing shall
be made in the name of the corporation, signed by
the person representing the corporation in the
official capacity designated in the articles of incorporation, or by a duly authorized agent or agents
10
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desigitated and named in a certificate filed by such
corporation in the office of the secretary of state,
and sealed with the seal of the corporation; an impression of which seal shall be filed in the office
of the secretary of state. The authority of any agent
or agents designated as herein provided shall continue until revoked. A corporation sole designating
an agent or agents to sign deeds and instruments
of writing by certificates may revoke such authority
by filing a notice of revocation of authority in the
office of the secretary of state. (Emphasis added)
The evidence before the Court indicates that Leland
R. Bruderer was not a duly authorized agent designated
and named in any certificate referred to in Section 16-7-8,
supra (Exhibit 12-D); therefore, the defendant cannot be
bound by any acts of the said Bruderer. Plaintiff is charged
with knowledge and had constructive notice of this statute,
the absence of such certificate and hence the lack of authority of Bruderer.
Assuming, nevertheless, for purposes of argument
that the aforementioned law does not limit the creation
of an agenqr by the corporation sole to the method provided in such statute, it is submitted that no actual or
apparent agency existed between defendant and Bruderer.
The evidence fails to establish any contract or appointment of Bruderer to represent defendant in contractual or
business relations with third persons, it being fundamental
that agency always connotes commercial or contractual
dealings between two parties by and through the medium
of another. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 2.
The lower court committed prejudicial error in finding that the " * * * defendant clothed its employee and
11
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agent, Leland Bruderer, with apparent authority to perform the acts which he performed including acknowledgment of plaintiffs assignment, that plaintiff was entitled
to and did rely upon Mr. Bruderer's acknowledgments
and the loss complained of by plaintiff resulted/' (Finding of Fact No. 8, R. 322) The finding is not only vague,
general, and begs the ultimate question; it is unsupported
by the evidence and contrary to law.
It is well settled that apparent authority is not to be
determined from the acts or statements of an agent, but
only from the acts or statements of a principal. This Court,
in the case of Leavitt v. Courturier (Utah) 23 P.2d 1101,
quoted with approval the following:
The apparent power of an agent is to be
determined by the acts of the principal and not by
the acts of the agent; a principal is responsible for
the acts of an agent within his apparent authority
only where the principal himself by his acts or
conduct has clothed the agent with the appearance
of authority, and not where the agent's own conduct has created the apparent authority.
See also Torrence National Bank v. Enesco Federal Credit
Union (Cal.) 285 P.2d 737; Christian et al v. Rice Growers
Association of California (Cal.) 123 P.2d 534; Start v.
Shell Oil Co. (Oregon) 260 P.2d 468; Cignetti v. American Trust Company (Cal.) 294 P.2d 490; Perkins v. Willacy (Alaska) 431 P.2d 141; 2A CJ.S. Agency § 161.
Again in Malin et al v. Giles et al 100 Utah 502, 114
F.2d 208, this Court stated:
The extent of an agent's apparent authority
is not measured by the extent of power exercised
12
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by the agent; but by the principal's conduct with
reference to the power exercised by the agent.
Either by action or by inaction where there is a
duty to act, the principal may create a situation
the reasonable interpretation of which, by a third
party with whom the agent is about to deal, is
such as to lead that third party to believe that the
agent has authority to deal with him as contemplated. Under such circumstances the law will
hold the principal responsible to that third party
for the results of that deal with the agent. But the
conduct of the principal must be such as occurs
prior to the deal, and not subsequent thereto. The
latter conduct may have evidentiary value as a
recognition by the principal of his former conduct,
or may evidence a waiver of his right to object to
lack of authority in his agent; but to be the inducement for the third party to enter into an agreement with the agent, the conduct must occur prior
to the agreement. 2 C.J.S. Agency § 96.
In furtherance of the foregoing principle, it has been
stated that there are three prereqviisites to the establishment of apparent authority:
In order to establish that an agent had the
apparent authority to do the act in question, it
must be established (1) that the principal has manifested his consent to the exercise of such authority
or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume
the exercise of such authority; (2) that the third
person knew of the facts and, acting in good faith,
had reason to believe, and did actually believe,
that the agent possessed such authority; and (3)
that the third person, relying on such appearance
of authority, has changed his position and will be
injured or suffer loss if the act done or transaction
executed by the agent does not bind the principal.
13
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3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 75; See also 2A CJ.S. Agency
§§ 161-163.
Proof of each of the foregoing requisites of apparent
authority is lacking in this case. There is no evidence upon
which a finding could be made that the defendant consented to the acts of Bruderer in accepting the Bank letters (Exhibits 2-P-Q 3-P-Q 4-P-C, 5-P-C) and his executing the same, or that defendant knowingly permitted
Bruderer to assume the exercise of such authority. Nor
does it appear in the record that Bruderer had ever been
authorized in the past to acknowledge corporate indebtedness, agree to and accept notice of assignments of corporate
debt, or draw and mail corporate checks on behalf of defendant.
It would seem elementary that a course of conduct
of a particular character does not exist where there is a
total absence of any conduct whatsoever of the character
claimed. In this case there is no evidence of any prior
dealing whatsoever between the plaintiff and defendant;
and there is no act whatsoever on the part of defendant
which would constitute ratification of the conduct of Bruderer in his receipt and execution of the Bank letters.
Assuming further for purposes of argument, and
despite the record, that some course of prior dealing had
occurred, it is submitted that a finding of apparent authority based upon earlier dealings requires that the prior
dealings must be of the same character as the act under
which it is claimed the principal is bound, and a required
degree of repetitiveness.
14
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Thus, in the case of Bennett v. Royal Union Mutual
Life Insurance Co. (Mo.) 112 S.W.2d 134, the Court stated:
Where previous acts done by the agent with
the acquiescence of his principal are relied upon
to establish apparent authority of the agent to do
the act in question, the prior acts shown in evidence must be of the same kind and character as
the act with which it is sought to charge the principal.* * * (Citing cases and treatise)
In Jennings et al v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Company
(Pa.) 202 A.2d 51, the principle was stated as follows:
Focusing on the first of these factors, in order
for a reasonable inference of the existence of apparent authority to be drawn from prior dealings,
these dealings must have (1) a measure of similarity to the act for which the principal is sought to be
bound, and, granting this similarity, (2) a degree
of repetitiveness. * * * (Citing cases)
Wewerka et al v. Lanton (Texas) 174 S.W.2d 630,
quotes with approval the following:
In 2 C.J.S., Agency, P. 1214, § 96, on the
question of apparent authority, we find this language: " Of course, no apparent authority grounded upon a course of conduct is assemble in the
absence of even a single precedent act or transaction to manifest the existence of the power claimed; a course of conduct of a particular character
does not exist where there is an utter absence of
any conduct whatsoever of the character supposed."
In this connection it has been said: "* * * The appearance of authority in one respect does not extend to
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other acts which are not of a like nature.* * *" Continental - St. Louis Corporation v. Ray Scharf Vending
Company, Inc. (Mo.) 400 S.W.2d 467.
And further: M* * * In any event a course of dealings is necessary to establish apparent authority. Isolated
or occasional transactions are not enough.* * *" Bogue
Electric Manufacturing Company v. Coconut Grove Bank
269 F.2d 1. See also Ziv Television Programs, Inc. v.
Associated Grocers Inc., of South Carolina (S.C.) 114 S.E.
2d 826.
The attention of the Court is invited to the foregoing
cases of Bennett, Jennings, Wewerka, Continental - St.
Louis, Bogue and Ziv, for not only the rules quoted, but
also for the reasoning which resulted in the rejection of
claims comparable to those here pressed by the plaintiff
Bank.
The record shows that Bruderer had certain duties
with the Seminaries and Institutes of the Church Educational System, relating and limited to the collection of
basic payroll information, the estimation of the cost of
furnishing seminary and institute rooms and the preparation of requisitions and the evaluation of specifications of
merchandise for use in the Seminary and Institute system.
The record does not show that Bruderer had any authority
to accept and agree to assignments, execute acknowledgment of corporate debt, or agree to the payment of that
debt.
The duty to prepare but not sign requisitions, obtain
and prepare payroll information of Seminary and Institute personnel, and evaluate cost and other specifications
16
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of merchandise, are hardly sufficient to reasonably warrant that Bruderer was one upon whom notice of assignments could be given, one who could execute acknowledgement of corporate debt, or who could agree to the method
of payment of that debt. There is no evidence to indicate
that Bruderer had any authority to manage or direct the
affairs of defendant generally or to handle defendant's
financial matters. Bruderer's duties were limited in nature
and confined geographically to his office; he was a subordinate in a long-line of persons in a hierarchy of the
Seminaries and Institutes Department, a part of the Church
Educational System, in turn one of many departments of
the Church.
To equate Bruderer's sole management responsibilities—supervising a full and part time secretary in one limited functional area of Seminaries and Institutes of the
aforementioned hierarchy—with those of one having general management and fiscal responsibilities for all of an
organization's activities within a given geographical area»
as plaintiff has attempted to do, is absurd.
N o inference that Bruderer had the authority plaintiff claims for him arose from his position with Seminaries
and Institutes. Bruderer had, by virtue of said position,
only the authority to do things which persons in analogous
positions in his locality, trade, or occupation and time
customarily did. Restatement, Second, Agency, p. 106,
§ 49 Comment c. The Bank, as Cook's principal in dealing
with Bruderer, had imputed notice of the latter's lack of
actual and apparent authority. Except for imputed knowledge from its agent Cook, the Bank had absolutely no
17
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knowledge of Bruderer or his position with Seminaries
and Institutes. As to the defendant, Bruderer had no position from which Cook or the Bank could infer agency of
any nature whatsoever.
As noted heretofore, among the requisites in establishing apparent authority, it must be shown that the third
person knew of the facts, and acting in good faith, had
reason to believe, and did actually believe, that agent
possessed such authority; and that the third person has
relied upon such appearance, and changed his position.
3 Am J u r 2d, Agency § 75.
N o evidence indicates that plaintiff knew of any act
of the defendant, nor did it rely upon any act of defendant,
in its dealings in question. The record shows that it relied
upon Cook alone for any information relating to the question of agency. Indeed, the Findings of Fact as entered
in this case are devoid of any finding that plaintiff relied
upon any conduct of the defendant whatsoever in entering
into the subject transaction. (R. 321-323) The reason for
the absence of such an essential finding is clear: Plaintiff
knew of no facts which would give appearance of authority, because there were none, and of course could not have
relied upon some non-existant conduct, and did not.
The evidence indicates that plaintiff did not even
know the nature of Bruderer's position at the time the
subject transactions took place. In fact as late as October
13, 1969, at which time plaintiff sent a letter to Bruderer,
plaintiff was under the erroneous assumption that payment
of accounts payable originated from Bruderer's office,
18
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(Exhibit 10-P), further indicating the negligent manner
in which plaintiff had entered into the subject transactions.
Not only is there an absence of a prior course of conduct of defendant which might mislead plaintiff to the
extent of authority, if any, of Bruderer, but in fact the
acts of defendant negative such authority, and placed
plaintiff on a duty of inquiry.
It is fundamental that a third person cannot assert an
apparent authority effective as against a principal where
there is a failure to discover the true state of the agent's
powers. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 162.
According to the case of Dohrmann Hotel Supply
Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc. 99 Utah 188, 103 P.2d 650:
* * # One dealing with a supposed agent is under
the duty to ascertain just what his capacity is.* * *
The treatise 2A C.J.S. Agency § 168 states:
The fact of dealing with one who claims or
is known to be acting as agent is in itself a signal
of danger, calling for the exercise of caution; and
a person so dealing assumes the risk which may
be involved, despite the difficulty of ascertainment in some cases as to the extent of the power.
Such a person is chargeable with notice of the
authority and powers of the agent. The law holds
him bound to know or discover them, and deems
him, in the absence of such investigation or information, as dealing at his peril, on the question of
whether his dealings come within the authority.
Ignorance of the extent of authority affords no excuse to one who deals with the agent outside of its
limits.
19
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In applying this rule, it has been held that no
one is bound to deal with an agent, and, that where
anyone does so as to matters beyond the actual
authority conferred, any trust and confidence as to
such matters is reposed by him and not by the
principal, so that where one of two innocent parties
must suffer from the wrongful acts of a third
person, that one must bear the loss who by a confidence reposed in the person acting wrongfully
has made it possible.
Litchfield v. Green (Ariz.) 33 P.2d 290; Ernst et ux v.
Searle (Cal.) 22 P.2d 715; Brutinel v. Nygren (Ariz.) 154
P. 1042.
In the instant case the plaintiff Bank made no inquiry
whatsoever of defendant regarding the authority, if any,
of Bruderer. The only contact was with Aldon Cook —hardly discharging the duty incumbent upon plaintiff to
inquire of defendant to ascertain the extent and character
of the authority of any claimed agent. While inquiry of an
alleged agent will not discharge the duty of inquiry, in
this case the plaintiff did not even inquire of Burderer!
See C.J.S. Agency § 169- It is submitted that the Bank,
a sophisticated lender, has no excuse for not meeting a
standard of inquiry equal to the ordinary business prudence test, especially in view of the fact that the transactions
involved an initial dealing with Bruderer.
Plaintiff's negligence is further indicated by its relying upon Cook for purposes of determining to whom the
so-called acknowledgement letters should be directed, and
having Cook deliver the same to Bruderer, and secure his
signature. It is submitted that such action by the plain20
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tiff constituted Cook its agent for such purposes and
charges plaintiff with knowledge of Bruderer's statement
that he did not have authority to sign the letters, and that
his act in so doing was adverse to the interests of a principal, if any.
The duty of plaintiff to inquire of defendant continued with subsequent transactions. The initial act of
Bruderer in the subject chain of events occurred on August
1, 1968, when he signed the first of the four so-called
acknowledgement letters. (Exhibit 2-P-C). More than five
months later, the plaintiff with full knowledge it had
not received checks drawn to joint payees pursuant to the
August 13, 1968 letter, and with further notice that during the same five month period 35 checks drawn by defendant in favor of Kerry-Aldon, Inc., in the total sum of
approximately $12,185.00 had been deposited to the latter's account with plaintiff (Exhibit 26-D), nevertheless,
on January 15, 1969, entered into a further transaction
with Kerry-Aldon, Inc. following the same procedural pattern, and without ascertaining of defendant or the Church
what Bruderer's capacity, if any, was.
More than seven months after the August 13, 1968
transaction, the plaintiff with full knowledge it had not
received checks drawn to joint payees pursuant to the
August 13, 1968 and January 15, 1969 letters, and with
equal knowledge that certain invoices enumerated in the
latter letter bore dates of October 10, 1968, and with
further notice that during the same seven month period
over 62 checks drawn by defendant in favor of KerryAldon, Inc., the total thereof exceeding $21,522.00, had
21
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been deposited to the latter's account writh plaintiff (Exhibit 26-D), nevertheless, on March 17 and March 26,
1969, entered into further transactions with Kerry-Aldon,
Inc. following the same procedural pattern, and without
ascertaining of either the Church or defendant the extent
of Bruderer's authority, if any.
When plaintiff directed Cook to take the so-called
acknowledgement letters to Bruderer, plaintiff did not
attach loan documents or invoices to allow for verification of the information represented in the letters. The
debt represented in the letters and "acknowledged" by
Bruderer exceeded the amount of the invoices; furthermore, the plaintiff had Bruderer "acknowledge" a debt
twice, although represented by a single invoice, and also
acknowledge a debt due by a vendor which had no relation to the Church. (Exhibit 5-P-P) Plaintiff also had
Bruderer "acknowledge" an assignment of an invoice and
indebtedness thereon in the amount of $34,966.00 which
invoice was non-existent. (No. 1171) (Exhibit 4-P-C)
As a general rule, the knowledge of an agent may
be imputed to the principal only in matters relevant to the
agency. This rule is explained by one treatise as follows:
. . . Knowledge acquired or notice received by an
agent which does not pertain to the duties of the
agent which does not relate to the subject matter
of the employment, or which affects matters outside
the subject matter of the employment, or which
affects matters outside the scope of his agency is
not chargeable to the principal unless actually
communicated to him. In other words the knowledge or notice must come to an agent who has
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authority to deal in reference to those matters which
the knowledge or notice affects.
(3 Am Jur 2d, Agency § 276)
Also, in order for the knowledge of one person to be
imputed to another under the law of agency, the knowledge must be of a person who is executing some agency,
and not that of one acting merely in some ministerial capacity, such as servant or clerk.
In the transactions out of which the instant case
arose, Bruderer clearly had no authority to deal in reference to those matters which the notice affected. The notice
also quite obviously did not concern matters related to the
subject matter of his employment or the scope of his
agency, if any.
The notices to Bruderer could not, therefore, be imputed to the defendant.
Furthermore, the rule that notice to an agent is notice
to the principal does not apply where the circumstances are
such as to raise a presumption that the agent will not
transmit his knowledge to his principal.
One treatise has elaborated upon this exception to the
rule as follows:
Accordingly, the principal is not charged with such
knowledge where the agent's personal interests
would be effected if facts known to him were
known to his principal; and the same result follows
where the agent is more intent in furthering the
interests of the opposite party than that of his principal, or the agent acquires information that it
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would be to his advantage to conceal from his
principal. Even if there is apparent authority to
receive notice on behalf of the principal, it is ineffective where the person relying on it has knowledge, or should have knowledge, that an adverse
interest exists. (Emphasis added)
(3 CJ.S. Agency, § 440, See also 3 Am Jur 206,
Agency §83)
In the instant case plaintiff's agent, Cook, not only
was aware of circumstances that would have created a
presumption that Bruderer would not transmit his information to the Church, let alone to the defendant, but he
had assured Bruderer that he (Cook) would himself act so
as to make such communication unnecessary (R. 104).
Obviously, it would not have been to Bruderer's advantage or in his interest to inform the Church or the
defendant that he had exceeded his authority by acknowledging corporate debt, especially non-existent or prospective debt, accepting notice of assignments, or agreeing
to have checks issued to joint payees.
It is equally clear that it would not have been to
Cook's advantage or in his interest to convey Bruderer's
lack of actual authority or the facts from which his lack
of apparent authority could be determined to the plaintiff. But plaintiff rather than the Church or defendant
should bear the loss because plaintiff selected Cook as its
agent for the specific purpose of having the "acknowledgments" executed and the "notice" delivered. Plaintiff
accepted Cook's representation that Bruderer was the proper addressee and signatory on behalf of the Church.
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As noted, plaintiff through its agent Cook had
knowledge that the acts of Bruderer in signing the socalled acknowledgements were adverse to the interests of
a principal, if any; and that certainly no act of defendant
clothed Bruderer with any authority to acknowledge an
indebtedness and assignment based upon a non-existent,
if not fraudulent, invoice and certain other indebtedness
unsupported in fact.
Plaintiff's position is that defendant is bound by an
agreement arising from the acts of Bruderer in signing
the so-called acknowledgement letters. It is fundamental
that consideration is an essential element of the validity
of a contract. 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 86. N o consideration supports the claimed agreement, and the same must
be unenforceable against the defendant.
Furthermore, the indebtedness which Bruderer is
claimed to have acknowledged in the subject transactions
was prospective. The evidence fails to indicate that there
was any contract or purchase order of the vendees to purchase the merchandise enumerated on the various invoices
at the time of the so-called acknowledgments; further, the
exhibits and testimony which relate to the transaction of
March 26, 1969 (Exhibits 4-P-C, D, E) involving the nonexistent invoice No. 1171, indicate no such contract or
purchase order was entered into, even subsequently. It
is submitted that no person has the authority to acknowledge prospective corporate indebtedness in behalf of another, or to accept assignments thereof, and agree to pay
that indebtedness.
25
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It is submitted that Bruderer was not the actual,
apparent, nor agent by estoppel of defendant; and that
in any event the acts of Bruderer upon which plaintiff
relies fall outside the scope of any possible duties which
Bruderer may have performed in connection with his
position with Seminaries and Institutes of the Church
Educational System.
POINT

III

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADJUDGING DEFENDA N T LIABLE FOR AMOUNTS IN EXCESS
OF THE BALANCE UNDER THE SECURED
NOTES.
The lower court committed additional prejudicial
error in adjudging defendant liable for amounts in excess
of the balance due under the three notes secured by the
assignments. The assignments were given as collateral,
and the balance including interest under the notes thus
secured is $49,558.31. (See Exhibits 1-P; 3-P-D; 4-P-D;
5-P-D) The lower court held the defendant liable for the
aggregate amount of the assignments, $59,205.80, apparently under the theory that any assigned sums in excess
of the balance due under the three secured notes should
be available to discharge other indebtedness in favor of
the Bank which had been incurred subsequently by KerryAldon, Inc. An analysis of this other indebtedness indicates it was incurred over a year after the 1969 transactions
involving the assignments (Exhibits 7-P-B; 8-P-C; 9-P-B),
and in one instance involved indebtedness of individuals
and not the assignor, Kerry-Aldon, Inc. (Exhibit 8-P-C).
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Section 70A-9-504 (2), Utah Code Annotated, provides:
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.
The complaint of plaintiff sought recovery of
$43,486.00, attorney fees, and costs, based upon the balance due under the three notes executed in 1969 (R. 214215). Over objection of the defendant, the lower court
allowed plaintiff to amend its complaint, pursue the issues
of additional indebtedness, and advance an additional
theory of recovery. (R. 80)
It is submitted that, assuming the validity of the assignments in question and any liability of the defendant
thereunder, the liability should not exceed the balance
under the three notes. (Exhibits 3-P-D; 4-P-D; 5-P-D).

POINT

IV

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING DEFENDANT
LIABLE W H E N PLAINTIFF H A D A RIGHT
OF OFFSET AGAINST KERRY-ALDON, INC.
It is a legal maxim that in the case where one of two
innocent persons must suffer injury or damage, the party
whose acts or omissions caused or permitted the injury or
damage to occur should bear the burden thereof. In the
instant case the Bank is far from an innocent party but
even if it were it still should not prevail. The Bank and
Aldon Cook, whom it sent to Bruderer, sought mutual
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economic advantage in entering into the transactions
which are the basis of this case. Defendant had nothing
whatsoever to gain from the transactions. The Bank and
Cook initiated the transactions and prepared all the documents. For this reason the Bank should bear the loss.
As the loans to Cook were supervised by an Assistant Vice President of the Bank, it should have been aware
of the financial condition of its debtor. The Bank could
have avoided loss resulting from its debtor's insolvency
had it exercised its right of offet when the notes became
due, as there were at those times ample funds to cover
the notes. (Exhibit 16-D). Farmers & Merchants Bank v.
Universal C.LT. Cr. Corp. 6 Utah 2d 413, 315 P.2d 653;
10 Am Jur 2d, Banks §666. It could have avoided extending the credit evidenced by the later notes at all had
it properly supervised the Kerry-Aldon, Inc. account. The
Bank would have been required to have exercised this right
to protect a surety or indorser if it knew that Kerry-Aldon,
Inc. was insolvent, and it certainly was aware that KerryAldon, Inc. wasn't paying its debts as they matured — one
test of insolvency. Surely an account debtor should be
similarly protected. 10 Am Jur 2d, Banks § 680.
The failure of the Bank to exercise its right of off-set
in order to collect the notes as they became overdue was a
direct proximate cause of the plaintiff's losses. The doctrine of avoidable consequences precludes plaintiff's recovery for these loans.
The law does not shift to a defendant a requirement
to pay damages for all of the consequences which flow
from his wrongful act or omission. Failure of a plaintiff
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to take reasonable action to limit damages will result in
the disallowance of damages for those consequences which
the plaintiff could have reasonably avoided. This doctrine
applies in contractual matters as well as in tort cases. Acts
which have been construed by the courts as "reasonable"
in the context of the nvoiHn nrer doctrine of^consequences
include entering into subsequent contracts and the expenditure of reasonable sums of money to avoid larger
losses. In the instant case, plaintiff could have avoided
all the losses of which it complains merely by properly
monitoring all its loans and collecting all of them by offset
as it did the loan made by it in August 1968—merely by
acting in a commercially reasonable manner. (22 Am Jur
2d, Damages §§ 30-37; 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 33, 34)

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR I N HOLDING DEFENDANT
LIABLE IN VIEW OF DEFICIENCIES I N THE
DOCUMENTS UPON W H I C H PLAINTIFF
RELIES.
There were numerous flaws and discrepancies in
the collateral assignments and other documents prepared
by the Bank and which should thus be construed strictly
against the Bank. Some of these flaws and discrepancies
which will now be noted go to the validity of the documents.
In the January 15, 1969, transaction, (Exhibit 3-P)
the purported assignment fails to designate the defendant
as the account debtor. The designation of the signatory
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of this assignment as Kerry-Aldon, Inc. had been added in
pen, perhaps after the instrument was executed. The letter from the Bank to Bruderer refers to the assignor as
Kerry-Aldon Associates rather than Kerry-Aldon, Inc.
and is directed to Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church.
Bruderer's title under his signature was supplied after
Bruderer had signed the "acknowledgment", by an unknown person. (R. 106, 107) The Bank's practice in
these matters was to secure notes by the collateral assignment of accounts with face value of approximately 133%
of the note amount (R. 95) It is apparent, therefore, that
other invoices must have been assigned to secure this January 15, 1969, promissory note. The balance currently
due on this note is $6,030.79. Only 13 of the 19 invoices
covered by the January 15, 1969 assignment were entered
into evidence by the Bank. (Exhibit 3-P-F through 3-P-R)
These 13 were all sold to the LDS Church Building Department rather than Seminaries and Institute Division of
the Church Educational Department.
This note was taken only 2 days after the August
13, 1968 note had been satisfied by involuntary offset
against Kerry-Aldon, Inc.'s checking account at the Bank.
(Exhibit 16-D, R. 171) The 1968 note was apparently 60
days overdue and none of the $18,978.36 worth of invoices of "LDS Church Department of Seminaries and
Institutes" securing the note had been paid jointly but
had in all probability been paid to Kerry-Aldon, Inc.
None of these January transaction documents refer to or
concern the defendant.
In the March 17, 1969 transaction, the Bank's letter
to Bruderer recited the assignment by Kerry-Aldon Associ30
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ates of certain numbered invoices totaling $10,192.04.
(Exhibit 5-P-C) The note face amount was $14,000, again
indicating that there was other security therefor. Despite
this there is no evidence that any other security was ever
realized on this note. The "acknowledgment" is dated
March 15th, the note March 17th, and the "assignment"
is undated. The Statement executed by Bruderer is^March
16, 1969, before the loan was ever made. Of the 18 invoices listed by number in the Bank's letter, the Bank has
furnished only 14, one of which was sold to Sevier School
and Office Supply, a purchaser not related to defendant
at all. The other invoices furnished indicate various vendees such as LDS School Division; LDS Church Building
Department; Church Building Department; Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, School Division; San
Bernardino District Seminaries; Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, School Purchasing Division; none of
them Seminaries and Institutes, LDS Church. The defendant is not mentioned in any of the documents involved
with the first March transaction.
In regard to the March 26, 1969 transaction the
Bank's letter to Bruderer also refers to Kerry-Aldon
Associates as assignor. (Exhibit 4-P-C) Bruderer affixed
his title as "Records and Budget". Someone else later
printed below those words, "Records and Budget Officer".
(R. 107) The assignment form used in the transaction did
not identify specifically the invoice supposedly assigned
— "invoice from Seminaries and Institutes, of L.D.S.
Church" (Exhibit 4-P-C). Furthermore, the invoice
allegedly assigned was a non-existent invoice No. 1171
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in the imaginery amount of $34,966.00. Of course, no
invoice was furnished with this set of documents. Defendant is nowhere named or alluded to in these documents.
The property right supposedly the subject of transfer is not sufficiently identified under the assignment
aforementioned, and is therefore ineffective. Section 70A9-318, U.C.A. 1953. It is also elementary that one cannot
assign a non-existent right. It is even "generally held that
an assignment of a right expected to arise uder a contract
not yet formed, or employment not yet existing, is ineffective to transfer such a prospective 'right'." 3 Williston on Contracts, § 413, p. 56.
Further analysis indicates that the foregoing assignment form was signed by Aldon Cook, individually, and
not by Kerry-Aldon, Inc., the content of the assignment
being here set forth:
K N O W ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned, for a valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,
hereby bargains, sells, assigns, transfers and sets
over unto Bank of Salt Lake of Salt Lake City all
the right, title and interest of the undersigned in
and to the following to wit: Invoices from Seminaries & Institutes, of L.D.S. Church, hereby constituting the said assignee as the true and lawful
attorney in fact for the undersigned irrevocably to
adopt and pursue all lawful ways and means to
collect and enforce and recover and reduce to
possession and ownership the property and rights
hereby transferred.
Dated this 26 day of March 1969.
/s/

Aldon Cook
(Exhibit 4-P-E)
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It is obvious that a non-existent invoice in the imaginary amount of $34,966.00 cannot be assigned, and certainly was not assigned by Kerry-Aldon, Inc., the only
signature thereon being that of Aldon Cook individually.
In the absence of such valid assignment the defendant
should not be charged in said amount of $34,966.00; nor
should defendant be charged in the additional amounts
of the other "assignments" for the reasons here advanced.
By letter dated April 22, 1969, Kerry-Aldon,, Inc/s
main supplier, Artco Bell Corporation, informed^hini that
it would require that the LDS Church make payment directly to it or no further merchandise would be shipped
to the Church. (Exhibit 17-D). Kerry-Aldon, Inc. was
required therein to give Artco Bell an assignment of all
future invoices and a Power of Attorney. N o one could
be liable to the Bank for materials not specifically and
validly assigned but especially could no one be liable on
invoices which Artco Bell had a superior assignment.
Bruderer obviously had no authority, actual, apparent or otherwise, to acknowledge indebtedness on invoices
which had already been paid at the time of their purported
assignment. Nor could such invoices be effectively assigned by any Kerry-Aldon entity. Given the week's lead time
required by the Church to process requests for payment
(R. 203), many of the invoices purportedly assigned by a
Kerry-Aldon entity had been paid prior to the assignment. For example, note invoices number 1026, 1031,
1040, 1041, 1043, 1089, (Exhibits 3-P-E and 24-D). It also
appears that some invoices were assigned before they were
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actually created. See invoices numbers 1115 and 1047
(Exhibits 3-P-E and 24-D).
An examination of Exhibits 5-P-C, 5-P-E and 25-D
indicates that invoices numbers 1036, 1148, 1151 and
1154, at least, were paid prior to their alleged assignment.
Comparing Exhibits 5-P-C and 3-P-E reveals that invoice
number 1036 was assigned and "acknowledged" twice.
Because the August, 1968, assignment did not list invoices
by number and the March 21, 1969, acknowledgment relating to the March 26, 1969 assignment listed the fictitious invoice number 1171 (Exhibits 4-P-C and 4-P-E),
no further positive identification of invoices paid before
their assignment or assigned more than once is possible.
To add insult to injury the lower court did not only
hold defendant liable for the full amount of the assignments acknowledged by Bruderer and refused to grant
defendant credit for amounts paid by others upon the
promissory notes, despite the fact that the acknowledged
amount included (1) invoices for materials purchased by
entities not related to the Church or defendant and (2)
duplicates of invoices to Church-related purchasers, (R.
83, 84); but in a final touch of irony the lower court
awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees according to the
terms of the notes. (R. 373, R. 310)
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed
for the following reasons:
1. The defendant was not named a party in any
of the documents upon which plaintiff relies for its recovery in this case. It's suing the defendant is an afterthought.
2. Plaintiff could not rely upon the acts of Bruderer
as an agent of defendant inofar as the acknowledgments,
receipts of notice, and the agreements as to the method
of payment were concerned because it had constructive
notice of the requirements of Section 16-7-8 U.C.A. 1953,
as amended, relative to the appointment of agents of
corporations sole with the power to execute deeds and
other written instruments.
3. Leland R. Bruderer had neither the actual, apparent nor estoppel authority to bind defendant by his
acknowledgment and agreement as to how certain indebtedness would be paid. Bruderer's notice and knowledge of the assignments, being outside the scope of his
employment, should not be imputed to the defendant.
4. The Banks' recovery against anyone but Cook,
Rapp and the Kerry-Aldon entities is barred by its contributory negligence in failing to inquire of the Secretary
of State's office so as to properly determine how to deal
with the defendant or to investigate the extent of Bruderer's authority, if any; in appointing Cook its agent for
purposes of securing the acknowledgments and giving
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notice of the assignment; in accepting the assignment of
duplicate, stray, prepaid and imaginary invoices, in failing
to properly supervise the loans to Kerry-Aldon entities
so that it could collect them by offset when overdue, or at
least make due inquiry why no monies had been received
from the assignments.
5. N o liability could be charged to the defendant on the general assignment of accounts receivable filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State's
office, long after the due date of the last of the notes
secured by invoices of any Church organization or entity,
but of which the defendant was not given notice.
6. No knowledge can be imputed to defendant by
virtue of the acknowledgments relied upon by plaintiff
because they are not addresed to defendant and thus could
not have been reasonably calculated to give it notice of
the assignments.
7. Even if Bruderer had been the agent of defendant with the authority to do the acts upon which plaintiff relies and even if defendant had been named as a
party in the documents relied upon by plaintiff, plaintiff
should not be allowed to prevail because the doctrine of
avoidable consequences applies to its failure to collect
the subsequent loans by offset as it had the August, 1968,
assignment.
8. In any event plaintiff's recovery should be limited
to the amounts actually due on the promisory notes as the
assignments were collateral assignments only.
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9. In no event should defendant be liable in the
"phoney" invoice No. 1171 in the imaginary amount of
$34,966.00.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND W. GEE
J. DOUGLAS MITCHELL
of and for
KIRTON, McCONKIE,
BOYER & BOYLE
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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